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Notes
STATE V. DAVIS: A PROPORTIONALITY CHALLENGE TO
MARYLAND'S RECIDIVIST STATUTE
The Maryland Court of-Appeals decision in State v. Davis' held
that a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for the fourth
conviction of a violent crime 2 does not violate the eighth amend-
ment3 proportionality requirement.' This holding, however, dem-
onstrates that a court's blind deference to legislative intent can lead
to a constitutionally suspect result.
This note reviews the defendant's criminal record in conjunc-
tion with the Maryland habitual offender statute5 and the federal
doctrine of proportionality.' In sum, this note suggests that the
court's review of the proportionality of Davis's sentence was subjec-
tive. More importantly, the court's efforts to uphold the legislative
intent underlying the Maryland recidivist statute yielded an unsa-
vory and disproportionate result for this nonviolent, habitual
offender.7
I. THE CASE
The defendant, Drexel Otto Davis, had a lengthy history of
criminal activities. His prior convictions consisted of four cases of
burglary in May 1966,8 one case of burglary in October 1966,' one
1. 310 Md. 611, 530 A.2d 1223 (1987),aff'g in part &rev'ginpart 68 Md. App. 581,
514 A.2d 1229 (1986).
2. See infra note 17. Capital punishment is the only other punishment authorized by
Maryland law that exceeds this penalty in severity. 68 Md. App. at 590, 514 A.2d at
1234.
3. The eighth amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII. Cf. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTs. art. 25 ("That excessive bail ought not to be re-
quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted, by the
Courts of Law.").
4. 310 Md. at 632, 530 A.2d at 1233. Specifically, the proportionality doctrine re-
quires that a criminal sentence be graduated and "proportionate to the crime for which
the defendant has been convicted." Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983).
5. See infra notes 8-35 and accompanying text,
6. See infra notes 36-69 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 73-105 and accompanying text.
8. On May 31, 1966, Davis was convicted and sentenced by Judge Joseph R. Byrnes
for "four cases of '[blurglary' in Baltimore City, to which Davis pleaded guilty and for
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case of daytime housebreaking in August 1975,' ° and two cases of
daytime housebreaking in October 1981." In January 1985 a Balti-
more County jury found Davis guilty of daytime housebreaking.12
With this conviction, Davis was sentenced to life imprisonment with-
out parole pursuant to article 27, section 643B(b),"3 the Maryland
habitual offender statute.' 4 Davis appealed his conviction and sen-
tencing to the Court of Special Appeals, which vacated his sentence
for want of proportionality. 5 The Maryland Court of Appeals, how-
which he was sentenced to five years each, with the first three sentences consecutive and
the fourth concurrent with the third." 310 Md. at 616, 530 A.2d at 1225.
9. On October 18, 1966, Davis was convicted and sentenced by Judge John E.
Raine, Jr., for "one case of '[b]urglary' in Baltimore County for which Davis, upon a
guilty plea, was sentenced to fifteen years to be served concurrently with the sentences
for the Baltimore City offenses." Id.
10. On August 11, 1975, Davis was convicted of "one case of daytime housebreaking
in Anne Arundel County for which Davis was sentenced to five years, with service of the
last three years suspended," Id. For a comparison of statutory burglary, common-law
burglary, and daytime housebreaking under Maryland law, see Reagan v. State, 4 Md.
App. 590, 594-95, 244 A.2d 623, 626 (1968).
Numerous jurisdictions impose harsh sentences for daytime housebreaking as a first
offense. In Maryland, the maximum sentence for daytime housebreaking is 10 years.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 30(b) (1987 & Supp. 1988). In comparison to other states,
Maryland imposes a lenient sentence for a first offense of daytime housebreaking. See.
e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 12.32, 30.02 (Vernon 1974) (maximum sentence for day-
time housebreaking as first offense is life imprisonment).
Further, numerous states impose between 15- and 25-year maximum sentence limi-
tations for a first offense of housebreaking. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-39-201, 5-4-
401(a)(3) (1987) (20 years); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1801(b) (1981) (15 years); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-7-1 (1988) (20 years); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 708-810, 706-661(2) (1985) (20
years); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 19-3, 1005-8-1 (Smith-Hurd 1977 & Supp. 1988)
(15 years); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-507, 28-105 (1985) (20 years); Omo REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2911.11, 2929.1 l(B)(l)(a) (Anderson 1987) (25 years); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 164.225,
161.605 (1983) (20 years); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 3502, 1103 (Purdon 1983) (20
years); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 22-32-3, 22-6-1 (1988) (15 years); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-3-403 (1982) (15 years); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-202, 76-3-203 (1988) (15 years);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-91 (1988) (20 years); W. VA. CODE § 61-3-11 (1989) (15 years).
11. On October 28, 1981, Davis was convicted and sentenced byJudge John R. Har-
grove for "two cases of daytime housebreaking in Baltimore City for each of which Davis
was sentenced to three years, to be served concurrently." 310 Md. at 616, 530 A.2d at
1226.
12. Id., 530 A.2d at 1225. "Davis was convicted of stealing items worth little more
than $100." 68 Md. App. at 591, 514 A.2d at 1234.
13. 310 Md. at 613, 530 A.2d at 1224. For the text of MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 643B(b) (1987 & Supp. 1988), see infra note 17.
14. The qualification of one of Davis's prior convictions was disputed at the sentenc-
ing hearing; nevertheless, the prior convictions were found to qualify in order to invoke
§ 643B. 310 Md. at 616, 530 A.2d at 1226.
15. 68 Md. App. at 585, 514 A.2d at 1233. Davis bifurcated his constitutional chal-
lenges at the Court of Special Appeals level. First, Davis urged that the lack of uniform
policy for invocation of the mandatory sentencing statute violated the equal protection
clause. The court rejected this challenge for lack of a discriminatory purpose or an arbi-
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ever, rejected the Court of Special Appeals determination and
found that Davis's predicate convictions supported invocation of the
habitual offender statute. Therefore, . the sentence imposed upon
Davis was constitutionally proportionate.' 6
In Davis the Maryland Court of Appeals addressed two issues:
(1) whether the defendant's prior convictions necessarily met the
criteria to invoke the Maryland habitual offender statute' 7 and (2)
whether imposing a life sentence without parole violated the princi-
trary classification. Id. at 589, 514 A.2d at 1233. See also Middleton v. State, 67 Md. App.
159, 168-72, 506 A.2d 1191, 1195-97, cert. denied, 308 Md. 146, 517 A.2d 771 (1986)
(similar equal protection challenges rejected). Second, Davis argued that the sentence
inflicted cruel and unusual punishment. 68 Md. App. at 589, 514 A.2d at 1233. He
urged that the sentence imposed did not meet the constitutional proportionality test.
The court held that the habitual offender statute was unconstitutional as applied to Da-
vis because the sentence violated the eighth amendment. Id. at 595, 514 A.2d at 1236.
16. 310 Md. at 632, 530 A.2d at 1233.
17. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 643B (1987 & Supp. 1988), states in pertinent part:
(a) "Crime of violence."-As used in this section, the term "crime of vio-
lence" means abduction; arson; burglary; daytime housebreaking under § 30(b)
of this article; kidnapping; manslaughter, except involuntary manslaughter;
mayhem and maiming under §§ 384, 385, and 386 of this article; murder; rape;
robbery; robbery with a deadly weapon; sexual offense in the first degree; sex-
ual offense in the second degree; use of a handgun in the commission of a
felony or other crime of violence; an attempt to commit any of the aforesaid
offenses; assault with intent to murder; assault with intent to rape; assault with
intent to rob; assault with intent to commit a sexual offense in the first degree;
and assault with intent to commit a sexual offense in the second degree.
The term "correctional institution" includes Patuxent Institution and a lo-
cal or regional jail or detention center.
(b) Mandatory life sentence.-Any person who has served three separate
terms of confinement in a correctional institution as a result of three separate
convictions of any crime of violence shall be sentenced, on being convicted a
fourth time of a crime of violence, to life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole. Regardless of any other law to the contrary, the provisions of this
section are mandatory.
(c) Third conviction of crime of violence.-Any person who (I) has been con-
victed on two separate occasions of a crime of violence where the convictions
do not arise from a single incident, and (2) has served at least one term of
confinement in a correctional institution as a result of a conviction of a crime of
violence, shall be sentenced, on being convicted a third time of a crime of vio-
lence, to imprisonment for the term allowed by law, but, in any event, not less
than 25 years.
Id. at (a), (b), (c). For a review of cases challenging § 643B(c), see Minor v. State, 313
Md. 573, 583-84, 546 A.2d 1028, 1033 (1988) (finding defendant's sentence under sub-
section (c) within constitutional limits); Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 91, 542 A.2d 1267,
1287 (1988) (finding Davis dispositive of an eighth amendment challenge to subsection
(c)); Creighton v. State, 70 Md.. App. 124, 135-36, 520 A.2d 382, 387-88 (1987) (analyz-
ing the statutory language of§ 643B(b) and (c)); Teeter v. State, 65 Md. App. 105, 117-
18, 499 A.2d 503, 509 (1985), cert. denied, 305 Md. 245, 503 A.2d 253 (1986) (rejecting
defendant's argument that § 643B(c) is unconstitutional under eighth amendment).
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pie of proportionality embodied in the eighth amendment.'" First,
the court analyzed and interpreted the burglary and housebreaking
crimes in Maryland' 9 in conjunction with Davis's prior history of re-
cidivism."0 The court reviewed the transcripts of the prior convic-
tions in order to adjudge whether the defendant met the requisite
qualifications needed to invoke section 643B(b).2' After much dis-
cussion, the court found that these fundamentals were met. 22
After analyzing the factual record of Davis's prior convictions,
the court turned to an assessment of the relevant eighth amendment
jurisprudence.2 ' The court examined the history of the eighth
amendment along with pertinent Supreme Court precedent. 24 As a
result, the court held that the sentence imposed upon Davis met the
proportionality requirements mandated by constitutional law.2 5
11. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. Habitual Offender Statutes
In an effort to target and deter violent recidivist criminals, the
General Assembly of Maryland enacted rigid sentencing laws to re-
move career criminals from society.26 Maryland's habitual criminal
statute subjects a violent career offender to a mandatory sentence of
life imprisonment without parole.27 In Montone v. State2 8 the Mary-
18. 310 Md. at 616, 530 A.2d at 1227.
19. See Reagan v. State, 4 Md. App. 590, 594-95, 244 A.2d 623, 626 (1968) (compar-
ing common-law burglary, statutory burglary, and daytime housebreaking).
20. See supra notes 8-14.
21. 310 Md. at 617-23, 530 A.2d at 1226-29.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 623, 530 A.2d at 1229. Davis did not challenge the facial constitutionality
of article 27, § 643B(b), but rather argued that § 643B(b) was unconstitutional as ap-
plied to him. 68 Md. App. at 591, 514 A.2d at 1234.
24. See infra notes 36-69 and accompanying text.
25. 310 Md. at 632, 530 A.2d at 1233.
26. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. See also Montone v. State. 308 Md. 599.
606, 521 A.2d 720, 723 (1987) (discussing the purpose and operation of the habitual
offender statute in Maryland). ,ccord Middleton v. State, 67 Md. App. 159, 166-72, 506
A.2d 1191, 1194-97, cert. denied, 308 Md. 146, 517 A.2d 771 (1986) (unsuccessful consti-
tutional challenge to the mandatory sentencing procedure of Maryland's habitual of-
fender statute); Bryan v. State, 63 Md. App. 210, 213,492 A.2d 644, 645, cert. denied, 304
Md. 296, 498 A.2d 1183 (1985) ("[Ofinding no constitutional infirmity" in the habitual
offender statute).
27. For the text of the statute, see supra note 17. Habitual offender statutes in other
jurisdictions illustrate the disparate penalties imposed. See, e.g., Kv. REv. STAT. AN,.
§ 532.080 (Baldwin 1985) (maximum sentence of life imprisonment with parole eligibil-
ity after 10 years); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-17 (1978) (enhancement of sentence from I
to 8 years depending upon the current conviction-no suspension or deferral allowed);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-7.6 (1986) (sentence for at least 14 years with credit for good
1989]
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land Court of Appeals enunciated the purpose of the recidivist stat-
ute-"to identify and target a unique class of people so that they
may be permanently exiled from our free society."2  Criminals sen-
tenced pursuant to the recidivist statute have been incarcerated for
three distinct periods of time with a resultant refusal to "conform
their conduct to societal standards."3 0 In sum, these criminals have
not evinced the benefits of rehabilitation and in effect are presumed
incapable of rehabilitation.
Maryland's habitual offender statute has three distinct require-
ments: (1) conviction for a crime of violence, (2) a sentence of im-
prisonment, and (3) three separate and distinct periods of actual
incarceration before a fourth conviction of a crime of violence. 3 ' As
a predicate requirement, an intervening term of incarceration must
separate two other terms of incarceration.3 2 This formality does not
include consecutive or concurrent sentences.33 Further, the statute
is directed narrowly toward habitual offenders of violent crimes.3 4
Overall, the Maryland recidivist statute is unique in statutory form;
the legislature's goal to remove "incorrigible" violent repeat offend-
behavior); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.01, 2929.11 (Anderson 1987) (maximum term
of 25 years); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1806 (1982) (life sentence without parole); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974 & Supp. 1986) (upgrade of offense between
25 and 99 years).
28. 308 Md. 599, 521 A.2d 720 (1987).
29. Id. at 606, 521 A.2d ait 723. The court further explained:
Section 643B(b) is unlike any other habitual offender statute in the country.
The Maryland statute requires more than merely "previous" convictions; it re-
quires separate convictions. Moreover, the statute's scope is narrowed by the
fact that it requires not only that an individual shall have received separate con-
victions, but that he shall have been sentenced to, and shall have actually sen'ed,
three separate terms of confinement under the jurisdiction of the correctional
system ....
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). Only four other states-Alabama, Dela-
ware, Louisiana, and Mississippi-have statutes Similar to Maryland. See ALA. CODE
§ 13A-5-9 (1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. I1, § 4214 (1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1
(West 1981); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-83 (1972 & Supp. 1985).
30. Montone, 308 Md. at 606, 521 A.2d at 723. See also Survey of Developments in Ma-
land Law, 1986-87-Criminal Law, 47 MD. L. REV. 793, 830 (1988) (discussion of .1ontone
decision). The court articulated two reasons for this qualification: (I) to avoid under-
mining the purpose of the recidivist statute-to weed out individuals incapable of re-
form, and (2) to ensure that two convictions are separated by an intervening term of
incarceration in order to evidence a criminal's incapability. for rehabilitation. .1lontone,
308 Md. at 613, 521 A.2d at 737.
31. 310 Md. at 615, 530 A.2d at 1225. For the text of the statute, see supra note 17.
32. Montone v. State, 308 Md. 599, 614, 521 A.2d 720, 727 (1987).
33. Id.
34. Id. For the definition of a "crime of violence," see supr a note 17.
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ers from society is praiseworthy. 5
B. Eighth Amendment Proportionality Jurisprudence
The eighth amendment,"6 as applied to the states through the
incorporation doctrine,3  proscribes cruel and unusual punish-
ments. The prohibitions of this amendment include (1) barbaric
methods of punishment and (2) punishments that are exceedingly
disproportionate to the crime committed.3" The concept of dispro-
portionality has evolved from English constitutional law."9
In particular, in common-law England, three chapters of the
Magna Carta embodied the proportionality principle for criminal
fines.40 Further, when incarceration rather than execution became
the norm, the common law prescribed that the punishment should
be proportionate to the crime, a principle later embraced in the
English Bill of Rights.4 The framers of the United States Bill of
Rights adopted verbatim the language of the English Bill of Rights
along with the proportionality principle.4 2
The proportionality principle explicitly has been endorsed in
our courts for nearly a century.43 Notably, the most common appli-
35. Montone, 308 Md. at 614, 521 A.2d at 727. For a cursory overview of the Gover-
nor's role in the parole process, see 310 Md. at 627 n.5, 530 A.2d at 1231 n.5.
36. See supra note 3.
37. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667, reh'g denied, 371 U.S. 905 (1962)
(application of the eighth amendment to the states through the fourteenth amendment).
Accord Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148, reh g denied,. 392 U.S. 947 (1968) (most
recent standard of incorporation of the Bill of Rights to the states through the four-
teenth amendment).
38. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 288 (1980) (plurality opinion) (Texas recidi-
vist statute invoked following a third felony conviction did not violate eighth amend-
ment). See also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 680-83 (1978) (reviewing remedial
measures of formerly unconstitutional conditions of confinement); Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651, 653 (1977) (students challenging disciplinary corporeal punishment in
schools). See generally Dressier, Substantive Criminal Law Through the Looking Class of Rummel
v. Estelle: Proportionality and Justice as Endangered Doctrines, 34 Sw. L.J. 1063 (1981); Note,
Recidivist Offenses: Can the JWhole be Greater Than the Sum of its Parts?, 26 Loy. L. REV. 698
(1980); Note, MandatoY Life Sentence Under Recidivist Statute Not Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment, 59 WAsH. U.L.Q 546 (1981).
39. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 288 (Powell, J., dissenting). Stemming from the Magna
Carta, the principle found its way into the English Bill of Rights, which was the model
for the United States Bill of Rights. Id. at 289. "Disproportionality analysis measures
the relationship between the nature and number of offenses committed and the severity
of the punishment inflicted upon the offender." Id. at 288.
40. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983).
41. Id. at 285.
42. Id. at 285-86.
43. Id. at 286. See. e.g., O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 337 (1892) (Field, J., dis-
senting). The seminal Supreme Court case proscribing grossly disproportionate
1989) 525
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cation is in the capital punishment arena." Yet, in the last decade,
the proportionality theory has gained popularity for challengers of
felony prison sentences, most commonly life sentences without pa-
role. The United States Supreme Court interpreted this issue in
both Rummel v. Estelle45 and Solem v. Helm.46
In Rummel the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment
for his third felony conviction under the Texas recidivist statute.47
The State charged Rummel with felony theft for obtaining $120.75
by false pretenses but, because Rummel had a prior criminal history,
the prosecution proceeded against him under the recidivist stat-
ute.4" Rummel challenged the sentence imposed as disproportion-
ate to the crimes committed.49 The Court, however, refused to
apply a proportionality analysis because the case did not involve a
capital offense.' ° In so doing, the Court upheld the sentence and
declared that the Texas recidivist statute did not violate the eighth
sentences is Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 381-82 (1910) (successful challenge
to the imposition of the punishment known as "cadena temporal" for the falsification of
public documents); accord Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667, reh'g denied, 371
U.S. 905 (1962) (finding that 90-day sentence for crime of being addicted to narcotics
was excessive); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality opinion) (meaning
of proportionality concept drawn from "evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society"); see generally Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punish-
ment: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REV. 838 (1972).
44. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (death penalty excessive for
nonculpable murder); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(death penalty excessive for crime of rape); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207, reh'g
denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976) (death penalty for armed robbery and murder held constitu-
tional); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972) (per curiam) (death penalty consti-
tutes cruel and unusual punishment).
45. 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (plurality opinion).
46. 463 U.S. 277 (1983). See generally Note, Life Sentence Without Parole Imposed on Re-
cidivist Guilty of Seven Non-Violent Crimes Constitutes Cruel and Unusual Punishment Under the
Eighth Amendment Proportionality Test, 14 U. BALT. L. REV. 177 (1984).
47. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 264. Prior to the revision of the Texas Penal Code, the
recidivist statute stated: "Whoever shall have been three times convicted of a felony less
than capital shall on such third conviction be imprisoned for life in the penitentiary."
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 63 (recodified at TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42 (Vernon
1974 & Supp. 1988)).
48. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 266. Rummel's previous convictions were for the fraudulent
use of a credit card to obtain $80 worth of goods and the passing of a forged check for
$28.36. Id. at 265.
49. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 267 (1980) (plurality opinion).
50. "Because a sentence of death differs in kind from any sentence of imprisonment,
no matter how long, our decisions applying the prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ments to capital cases are of limited assistance in deciding the constitutionality of the
punishment meted out to Rummel." Id. at 272. For opinions dealing with the propor-
tionality of a death penalty sentence, see, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592
(1977) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, reh'g denied, 429 U.S.
875 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, .458 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. 51 Indeed, the
statute was found to promote the legitimate societal purpose "in
dealing in a harsher manner with those who by repeated criminal
acts have shown that they are simply incapable of conforming to the
norms of society as established by its criminal law." 5 Simply put,
the severity of the sentence imposed pursuant to the recidivist stat-
ute was virtually immune from constitutional scrutiny; that is, the
majority did not find it necessary to embark upon a proportionality
analysis. Two partial justifications for this lack of scrutiny were (1)
the possibility that Rummel was eligible, if warranted, for parole af-
ter twelve years53 and (2) a reluctance to review legislatively man-
dated terms of incarceration. 54 Three years later the Court in Helm
virtually ignored this plurality opinion.55
In Helm Justice Powell 6 analyzed whether a life sentence with-
out parole violated the eighth amendment in a noncapital case de-
spite the traditional viewpoint that a proportionality review was only
applied in capital cases.5" The State of South Dakota invoked its
51. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 285.
52. Id. at 276. Further, the severity of a sentence is largely within the discretion of
the punishing jurisdiction. Id. at 285.
53. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 280-81 (1980) (plurality opinion).
54. Id. at 274.
55. The majority in Helm broadly asserted that its "decision is entirely consistent
with . . . Rummel v. Estelle" and that the proportionality principle can'be applied to
cases of imprisonment. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 n.13, 289 (1983). The dis-
sent, however, urged that "the Court blithely discardled] any concept of stare decisis ...
and distort[ed] the concept of proportionality of punishment by tearing it from its moor-
ings in capital cases." Id. at 304 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) ("Although today's holding
cannot rationally be reconciled with Rummel, the Court does not purport to overrule
Rummel").
In 1982 the Supreme Court ruled on the proportionality of a 40-year sentence
under Virginia law for "the crime of possessing less than nine ounces of marihuana
.Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 371 (per curiam), reh 'g denied, 455 U.S. 1038 (1982).
Relying on Rummel, the Court indicated its reluctance to review the terms of imprison-
ment and that a successful eighth amendment challenge should be "'exceedingly
rare.' " Id. at 374 (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272, 274). Justice Powell, concurring in
judgment only, remained steadfast with the principles he espoused in his dissent in Rum-
reel: "[Olur system of justice always has recognized that appellate courts do have a
responsibility--expressed in the proportionality principle-not to shut their eyes to
grossly disproportionate sentences that are manifestly unjust." Id. at 377 (Powell, J.,
concurring in judgment only) (emphasis in original). Indeed, Justice Brennan further
articulated that blind deference "cannot justify the complete abdication" of enforcing
the eighth amendment. Id. at 383 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
56. Justice Powell previously explained his viewpoint on the proportionality review
of noncapital cases in his dissenting opinion in Rummel, 445 U.S. at 285 (Powell, J., dis-
senting). In fact, the dissenters in Rummel became the majority in Helm.
57. Helm, 463 U.S. at 279. See generally Note, Proportionality Review of Recidivist Sentenc-
ing is Required by the Eighth Amendment, 33 DE PAWt. L. R~v. 149 (1983).
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recidivist statute-" and sentenced Helm to life imprisonment with-
out parole for the felonious uttering of a "no account" check.5 9 The
Court concluded that Helm's sentence was significantly dispropor-
tionate to his crime and thus violated the eighth amendment's pro-
scription of cruel and unusual punishment of criminals.60
Unique to the Helm opinion was the objective tripartite standard
of review that a court may use when extensively analyzing a sentenc-
ing claim on eighth amendment grounds. 6' First, a court looks to
the "gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty."' 62 Sec-
ond, "it may be helpful to compare the sentences imposed on other
criminals in the same jurisdiction. '6 Third, "courts may find it use-
ful to compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same
crime in other jurisdictions."'
The Helm majority purportedly distinguished Rummel because
Rummel was eligible for a relatively early parole.65 Also, the major-
ity vaguely pronounced, in dicta, the standard for judicial review
when a sentence is challenged for disproportionality:
58. The recidivist statute states:
If a defendant has been convicted of three or more felonies in addition to the
principal felony and one or more of the prior felony convictions was for a crime
of violence as defined in subdivision (9) of § 22-1-2, the sentence for the princi-
pal felony shall be enhanced to the sentence for a Class I felony.
S.D. CODIFIED lAws ANN. § 22-7-8 (1988). The sentence for a Class I felony is "life
imprisonment in the state penitentiary." Id. § 22-6-1(3).
59. Helm, 463 U.S. at 279-80. Helm's criminal history consisted of three convictions
of third degree burglary, one conviction of grand larceny, one conviction of obtaining
money under false pretenses, and three offenses of driving while intoxicated. The
crimes were neither violent nor against a person. Id.
60. Id. at 303.
61. Id. at 290-92.
62. Id. at 290-91. Other relevant variables that a court can take into consideration
are nonviolent crimes versus violent crimes, the actual harm caused to a victim or soci-
ety, the absolute magnitude of the crime, and the culpability of the defendant. These
factors further illustrate that the analysis should be on a broad scale. Id. at 292-94. See
generally Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, The Seriousness of Crimes: Normative Structure and Indi-
vidual Differences, 39 AM. Soc. REv. 224 (1974). See also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,
797-801 (1982) (Court thoroughly examined circumstances of defendant's crime).
63. Helm, 463 U.S. at 291. "If more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty,
or to less serious penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at issue may be
excessive." Id. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380-81 (1910) (identify-
ing an exhausting list of more serious crimes subject to less serious penalties).
64. Helm, 463 U.S. at 291-92. This criterion is self-explanatory. Cf Enmund, 458
U.S. at 801 (death penalty held to be excessive for felony murder under the circum-
stances). The use of the word "may" in prongs two and three connotes that they are not
mandatory criteria. Helm, 463 U.S. at 291.
65. See Helm, 463 U.S. at 297. The majority reasoned that Helm would spend the
rest of his life in prison while Rummel was eligible for parole within 12 years. Id.
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[Wie do not adopt or imply approval of a general rule of
appellate review of sentences. Absent specific authority, it
is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judg-
ment for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriate-
ness of a particular sentence; rather, in applying the Eighth
Amendment the appellate court decides only whether the
sentence under review is within constitutional limits. In
view of the substantial deference that must be accorded
legislatures and sentencing courts, a reviewing court rarely
will be required to engage in extended analysis to de-
termine that a sentence is not constitutionally
disproportionate.66
Not surprisingly, this footnote has sparked substantial debate over
the propriety of engaging in an extended proportionality analysis."7
For example, under what circumstances will a sentence warrant re-
view? This threshold issue remains open to query.
Justice Powell also brought to the surface two underlying as-
sumptions regarding a proportionality review: that judges are com-
petent to assess the gravity of an offense and that the courts are able
to contrast and compare different sentences.6 Yet these assump-
tions may prove to be too idealistic. Nevertheless, with Helm's uni-
form analytical framework intact, a review of sentences for
proportionality supposedly will guarantee a criminal defendant con-
stitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishment.6 9
III. ANALYSIS
The Maryland Court of Appeals' refusal to invoke the eighth
amendment to invalidate a life sentence without parole resulted in a
constitutionally infirm sentence for Davis.70 In so doing, the court
mirrored the legislative intent to remove habitual offenders from
free society.7" The court and legislature justified their position by
assuming that the recidivist is unresponsive to rehabilitation and
therefore in need of segregation from the community. 72 Despite
66. Id. at 290 n.16 (emphasis added).
67. See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
68. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292-94. 303 (1983).
69. Id.
70. State v. Davis, 310 Md. 611, 613,530 A.2d 1223, 1224 (1987), aff g in part &rev'g
in part 68 Md. App. 581, 514 A.2d 1229 (1986).
71. Id. at 614-15, 530 A.2d at 1225.
72. Id. Accord Montone v. State, 308 Md. 599, 614, 521 A.2d 720, 727 (1987)
("criminals who qualify for punishment under § 643B(b) are incorrigible and beyond
rehabilitation"); cf. Justice Rehnquist's discussion in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263
(1980) (plurality opinion):
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this deference accorded to state legislatures, a court should not ig-
nore the circumscribed protections embodied in the Bill of Rights.
Even so, the court glossed over the mandates of Rummel and Helm
without an in-depth analysis and applied a proportionality review
without reconciling the two precedents.
A. Extended Review
After Rummel and Helm, a court reviewing a sentencing appeal
will find it difficult to reconcile the principles espoused in either
case. That is, if Rummel is controlling, an appellate court need not
engage in the proportionality analysis set forth in Helm. Yet, if Helm
is controlling, an extended tripartite analysis is preferred.73 Indeed,
whether Helm effectively overruled Rummel remains controversial."
The purpose of a recidivist statute such as that involved here is not to simplify
the task of prosecutors, judges, or juries. Its primary goals are to deter repeat
offenders and, at some point in the life of one who repeatedly commits criminal
offenses serious enough to be punished as felonies, to segregate that person
from the rest of society for an extended period of time. This segregation and
its duration are based not merely on that person's most recent offense but also
on the propensities he has demonstrated over a period of time during which he
has been convicted of and sentenced for other crimes.
Id. at 284.
73. Several commentators have suggested that Helm repudiated Rummel. See, e.g.,
Bradley, Proportionality in Capital and Non-Capital Sentencing. An Eighth Amendment Enigma,
23 IDAHO L. REV. 195, 211 (1986-87) ("Solem is important not only because the Court
effectively wrote Rummel out of the body of eighth amendment case law .... "); Note,
Solem v. Helm: The Courts' Continued Struggle to Define Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 21
CAL. W.L. REv. 590, 608 (1985) ("Solem does not technically overrule Rummel. However,
in theory it must overrule Rummel .... "). See also Williams v. State, 539 A.2d 164, 172
(Del. Super. Ct. 1988) ("Although Solem did not go so far as to overrule Rummel, it did
repudiate much of the reasoning upon which Rummel relied." (footnote omitted)).
74. See Minor v. State, 313 Md. 573, 546 A.2d 1028 (1988). In Minor the Maryland
Court of Appeals concluded that an extended proportionality analysis was not
mandatory for a 25-year sentence without parole for daytime housebreaking imposed
pursuant to MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 643B(c) (1987 & Supp. 1988). Id. at 583, 546
A.2d at 1034. In a concurring opinion, Judge Eldridge argued that Helm is controlling.
Id. at 587, 546 A.2d at 1034-35 (EldridgeJ., concurring). Judge Adkins has yet another
interpretation-"I read Helm as effectively overriding Rummel and Hutto .... " Id. at 590,
546 A.2d at 1036 (Adkins, J., dissenting). Accord Whitmore v. Maggio, 742 F.2d 230,
233-34 (5th Cir. 1984) (remanding a federal habeas corpus appeal for at least a perfunc-
tory Helm analysis); but see United States v. Rhodes, 779 F.2d 1019, 1027-28 (4th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986) (refusing to engage in extended proportionality
analysis for lengthy sentences imposed under 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982)); Mosley v. State.
500 So. 2d 108, 110 (Ala. Grim. App. 1986) (life sentence without parole upheld without
extended proportionality review for rape); Caulder v. State, 500 So. 2d 1362, 1366 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (life sentence without parole for 25 years imposed for first offense
of statutory sexual battery upheld without extended proportionality review); State %,.
Vance, 164 W. Va. 216, 233, 262 S.E.2d 423, 432 (1980) (nonapplicability of propor-
tionality doctrine in reviewing state habitual offender statute).
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In Davis, for example, the Maryland Court of Appeals refused to rec-
oncile Rummel and Helm. Rather, in the alternative, the Court of Ap-
peals engaged in a judicial review of Davis's sentence under Justice
Powell's objective criteria after pronouncing that the review was un-
necessary.75 This reasoning evidences the confusion left in the
wake of Rummel and Helm.
Unfortunately, the extended review of Davis's sentence against
the Helm criteria disclosed weaknesses in the Helm criteria.7 6 Fur-
ther, the court overlooked many similarities between Helm and the
instant case. 7' Although extreme deference is to be given to a state
legislature's efforts to impose criminal sanctions against lawbreak-
ers, legislative mandates are not always correct.7 8
B. The Gravity of the Offense and the Harshness of the Penalty
The first criterion of the Helm analysis is a review of the serious-
ness of the crime and the strictness of the penalty.79 Davis had a
total of four prior convictions for both daytime housebreaking and
burglary; in Maryland, daytime housebreaking and burglary are
characterized as "crimes of violence."8 The defendant in Helm,
however, similarly had three prior third degree burglary convictions
along with convictions for grand larceny, larceny by false pretenses,
75. 310 Md. at 633-39, 530 A.2d at 1234-37.
76. Id. In Alinor Judge Eldridge profoundly suggested that a proportionality review
need not be limited to Justice Powell's three criteria:
Moreover, proportionality review need not always consider, and always be lim-
ited to, the three factors discussed in . . . Justice Powell's Solem opinion. It is
noteworthy that the second and third factors were set forth as mere suggestions
or possibilities. In some cases, an examination into the sentences imposed in
other jurisdictions may be unnecessary and not very fruitful; in other cases, it
may be quite helpful. Considerations apart from the three factors mentioned in
... the Solem opinion are also pertinent, including deference to the legislative
judgment, the particular facts concerning the commission of the crime, information in a
pre-sentence investigation report, etc. I think that it would be unfortunate if
Eighth Amendment proportionality review of sentences were frozen in the
form of a "three criteria" review.
Minor, 313 Md. at 587-88, 546 A.2d at 1035 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
77. Davis averred that Helm was dispositive because the crimes were similar and char-
acterized as minor by the Supreme Court. The court, however, agreed with the State
and held that "Helm is not factually dispositive of the instant case." 310 Md. at 628, 530
A.2d at 1232. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
78. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983). "In view of the substantial deference
that must be accorded legislatures and sentencing courts, a reviewing court rarely will be
required to engage in extended analysis to determine that a sentence is not constitution-
ally disproportionate." Id. at 290 n.16.
79. Id. at 292. See supra note 62.
80. See supra note 17. For a chronological history of Davis's prior criminal activity,
see supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text. The court emphasized the increased risks
19891
532 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VoL. 48:520
uttering, and driving while intoxicated.8 The Helm Court character-
ized these offenses as minor and nonviolent and concluded that a
sentence of life imprisonment without parole was too severe. 2
Nonetheless, Davis's virtually similar situation was labeled a "crime
of violence" by the state legislature, thus triggering invocation of
the recidivist statute.
The Maryland court did not afford this criterion enough weight
in the proportionality review. According to the facts presented in
the trial court, Davis's acts were nonviolent; no evidence suggested
the possession of a dangerous weapon.83 In fact, Davis stole items
with a value of just over $1004 and his two prior criminal acts in-
volved items of even less value.85 In effect, both the innocuous na-
ture of the defendant's acts and the gravity of the prior offenses
were moderate in relation to the harshness of the penalty imposed.
Nevertheless, the court refused to assess the particular facts of Da-
vis's crimes. Indeed, this reluctance suggests that the facts of the
predicate crimes involved are immaterial and not subject to review.
Yet the Helm Court did not espouse that viewpoint; in fact, the
Court delved into a review of the crimes Helm actually committed. 6
Accordingly, the first prong of the proportionality test as applied is
flawed because the court failed to analyze this prong as Helm
prescribed.8 7
associated with entering a dwelling house as opposed to entering a building. 310 Md. at
628, 530 A.2d at 1232. The similarities of the crimes, however, are axiomatic.
Other concerns underlie the stringent penalties imposed upon housebreakers-.
"risk of personal harm and the right to be free of intrusion." Id. at 635, 530 A.2d at
1235. Indeed, there are instances where daytime housebreaking transpired into murder.
See Johnson v. State, 303 Md. 487, 500, 495 A.2d I, 7 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1093
(1986) (victim killed during daytime housebreaking); Colvin v. State, 299 Md. 88, 95,
472 A.2d 953, 956 (1984) (same). These concerns served to justify the Maryland legisla-
ture's inclusion of daytime housebreaking and burglary in the category of "crimes of
violence." 310 Md. at 629, 530 A.2d at 1232.
81. Helm, 463 U.S. at 279-81.
82. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 279, 303 (1983).
83. 68 Md. App. at 591, 514 A.2d at 1234. Cf. Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 141 (4th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974) (nonviolence of offense is factor for consider-
ation). But see Teeter v. State, 65 Md. App. 105, 110-11, 499 A.2d 503, 505-06 (1985),
cert. denied, 305 Md. 245, 503 A.2d 253 (1986) (malicious destruction of property).
84. 68 Md. App. at 591, 514 A.2d at 1234. Cf. Seritt v. Alabama, 731 F.2d 728, 732
(1 th Cir. 1984) (finding Helm inapposite because of violent nature of defendant's
felony).
85. The list of items stolen during Davis's most recent crimes included $80 in cash.
ten chocolate chip cookies, and a quarter pound of salami luncheon meat totaling $1.50
in value. In 1966 and 1975, however, Davis's stolen goods totaled over $2000. 68 Md.
App. at 591-92, 514 A.2d at 1234.
86. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 280 (1983).
87. The Court of Special Appeals held that the gravity of the offenses was dispropor-
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To further illustrate, daytime housebreaking, burglary, and ar-
son are the only listed "crimes of violence" that are not crimes
against a person.8 8 Interestingly enough, however, neither assault
nor battery is listed as a crime of violence in section 643B(a)." 9
Therefore, the mere legislative labeling of daytime housebreaking
and burglary as crimes of violence, which in'turn triggers the
mandatory habitual offender statute, has evoked a harsh result for
nonviolent offenders. That is, no matter how innocuous and passive
Davis's crimes were, Davis would be subject to the same penalties as
a felony murderer.90 Surely Justice Powell did not envisage such
deference to a law-making regime without thoroughly examining
the pettiness of the offense. In sum, it appears that the first criterion
of the objective Helm test clearly was exposed to an analysis that
gave extreme, almost blind, deference to the General Assembly.
C. Sentences Imposed on Other Crimes in the Same jurisdiction
The Court of Appeals also incorrectly assessed the second
prong of the Helm analysis.9 ' At this stage, the court reviewed vari-
ous sentences imposed in Maryland for crimes of a more serious
nature.9" The Maryland Court of Special Appeals in its decision re-
vealed five crimes that are not categorized as "crimes of violence."-93
tionate to the seriousness of the Maryland penalty. Id. at 592, 514 A.2d at 1234, In
addition, the court explained that the value of the property was only a consideration
when the crimes were nonviolent. Id. n.2. The Supreme Court, however, has recognized
the relevance of assessing the "absolute magnitude of the crime. Stealing a million dol-
lars is viewed as more serious than stealing a hundred dollars." Helm, 463 U.S. at 293.
The Court of Appeals in Davis, however, did not find the pettiness of the offense persua-
sive. 310 Md. at 635, 530 A.2d at 1235.
88. See supra note 17.
89. Id. "In assessing the nature and gravity of an offense, courts have repeatedly
emphasized the element of violence and danger to the person." Hart v. Coiner, 483
F.2d 136, 140 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974).
90. See supra note 17.
91. Solem v. Helm, 463 US. 277, 291 (1983). See supra note 63 and accompanying
text.
92. 310 Md. at 635, 530 A.2d at 1235.
93. The court noted:
For example, the following obviously violent crimes, even if repeated four
times, would not result in the automatic imposition of a life sentence without
possibility of parole because they are not included under § 643B(a): burglary
with explosives (§ 34), child abuse (§ 35A), and third degree sexual offense
(§ 464B). Poisoning water, drink, or food (§ 451) is another crime not covered
by the repeat offender provision. Also, Davis would not suffer such a harsh
penalty had he been a habitual cocaine distributor, rather than a housebreaker.
A person with previous drug convictions would still enjoy a possibility of pa-
role. See § 286(b).
68 Md. App. at 592-93, 514 A.2d at 1235.
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The Court of Appeals disregarded these crimes and concluded that
they were of "almost no significance" to the second prong of the
Helm evaluation.94 This reasoning is weak and inappropriate. In-
deed, consideration of the penalties imposed for other grave violent
crimes in Maryland evidences the irrationally disparate treatment
given Davis.95 Examination of the other serious crimes in the same
jurisdiction is the bedrock of this criterion; it is not an immaterial
task that can be ignored.
More specifically, in Maryland there are several violent crimes
that, if perpetrated four times, would not yield a life sentence with-
out parole.96 Notably, the crime of child abuse, burglary with explo-
sives, drug distribution, and third degree sexual offenses are not
within the ambit of a "crime of violence." 97 Yet Davis's sentence
was harsher than repeat offenders who commit these life-threaten-
ing crimes. This impressive list of more serious crimes indicates
that the punishment Davis received as a nonviolent housebreaker
was excessive. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals summarily dis-
posed of this issue with little analysis. 98 The mere fact that the legis-
lature included only certain offenses as "crimes of violence" does
not mean a court should be deterred from engaging in a Helm analy-
sis, especially when it is considering the proportionality of a life sen-
tence without parole. Indeed, this is exactly what the Court of
Appeals did. Not surprisingly, this is not the type of analysis that
Helm directed. From a proportionality standpoint, the second crite-
rion of the Helm analysis weighed in Davis's favor.
D. Comparison of the Sentences Imposed for Commission of the Same
Crime in Other Jurisdictions
Progressing to the third prong of the Helm analysis, the Davis
court seemingly narrowed its approach.9 9 This prong includes a re-
view of other jurisdictions' sentences for the same caliber of
crimes.' 00 After conceding that only three other states authorize a
94. The court quickly disposed of this argument, concluding that the lack of inclu-
sion "rests on a rational basis." 310 Md. at 636, 530 A.2d at 1236.
95. Cf. Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 142 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983
(1974) (analogous comparison of penalties under West Virginia law).
96. See supra note 93.
97. The court broadly deferred to the legislative judgment in this area. 310 Md. at
636, 530 A.2d at 1236. Broad deference, however, should not lead to constitutional
deprivations.
98. Id. at 635-36, 530 A.2d at 1236.
99. Id. at 636-37, 530 A.2d at 1236.
100. Id.
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life sentence without parole for career criminals, '0 the Court of Ap-
peals justified its reasoning by complimenting the Maryland legisla-
ture's aggressiveness in dealing with habitual offenders.' 0 2 This
interjurisdictional comparative review revealed that Davis would not
have received a life sentence without parole in forty-seven other
states.'0 3  Objectively, the severe penalty authorized by the Mary-
land recidivist statute was harsher than the normative range of
sentences in a majority ofjurisdictions. 0 4 Admittedly, the mere fact
that the first two criteria were constitutionally suspect would not au-
tomatically weigh the third criterion in favor of Davis. It can be ar-
gued, however, that a sentence is not constitutionally proportionate
just because a few other states have punishments equally as harsh.
Because the application of the first two criteria were constitutionally
questionable and the third criterion demonstrated the sentence was
at the harshest end of the spectrum, it is a logical extension that
Davis's sentence was constitutionally disproportionate.
E. Risks of an Extended Review
The court's blind deference to the categorical "crime of vio-
lence" label defined by the State legislature, evinced the court's de-
sire to allow the legislature to mandate penological objectives.
Although the Helm majority recommended that the judiciary grant
broad deference to state legislatures, a court must avoid subjectivity
when reviewing a sentence for proportionality. Justice Powell
framed two assumptions inherent in the proportionality review: the
ability of the courts to judge the gravity of an offense and the ability
of a court to compare different sentences.' 0 5 As demonstrated,
these factors can prove to be illusory. That is, the Davis court failed
101. Id. Maryland's draconian habitual offender statute is congruent to the habitual
offender statute in Delaware, Nevada, and South Dakota. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§§ 4214, 825 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.010 (1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-
7-8 (1988).
102. The court took pride in the fact that Maryland maintains a leading position.
Moreover, the court concluded that Delaware had the harshest penalty for habitual of-
fenders, thereby satisfying the third prong automatically. The court quoted Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (plurality opinion): "[Aibsent a constitutionally imposed
uniformity inimical to traditional notions of federalism, some State will always bear the
distinction of treating particular offenders more severely than any other State." Id. at
282.
103. 310 Md. at 637, 530 A.2d at 1236.
104. The majority of states-33 other jurisdictions-provide for either "an enhanced
term of years for habitual offenders, leave the sentencing to the discretion of the trial
court, or provide for the possibility of parole if a habitual offender is sentenced to life
imprisonment." 68 Md. App. at 594, 514 A.2d at 1235.
105. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983).
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to judge the gravity of the offense. For example, the fact that the
court did not recognize the magnitude of the crime-stealing rela-
tively small amounts of property in a nonviolent manner-illustrates
the court's inability to judge the gravity of the offense. Arguably
Davis's proportionality review was based on the bench's personal be-
liefs about the relationship of a crime to its punishment. In sum, the
reasoning of Davis clearly illustrates that these assumptions are via-
ble risks for an extended proportionality review.
Justifiably, Davis's sentence should have failed the Helm analy-
sis. A close examination of each criterion of the Helm test revealed
weaknesses in judging the gravity of the offense in Maryland, com-
paring sentences imposed for other serious crimes in Maryland, and
comparing Davis's sentence with that imposed in other jurisdictions.
Davis received one of the harshest sentences in the State for rela-
tively moderate nonviolent criminal conduct. The Court of Ap-
peals' aggressive application of the Maryland recidivist statute is its
testament to the legislature's commitment to punish and deter
recidivists.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Davis opinion reflects the Maryland Court of Appeals' gen-
uine concern for the prevention of habitual criminal activities.
There are, however, a few basic precautions that the judiciary
should take when analyzing a sentence for proportionality.
Although deference should be given to a state legislature, blind def-
erence can result in an unfair, disproportionate sentence which is of
questionable constitutionality. Moreover, personal, subjective be-
liefs should not participate in the decisionmaking process. Davis's
sentence was significantly disproportionate to his crime; the Court
of Appeals should have affirmed the lower court and vacated the
sentence for want of proportionality.
KAREN D. BAYLEY
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